Abstract

International law is designed to make each state responsible for the human rights protection of its own population; this includes litigation for violations targeting another state. This text posits that broadening state responsibility to include violations of human rights in other states as well as towards citizens of other states is not only desirable and feasible, but also necessary.
This paper examines a paradox in international human rights law. Human rights are declared to be universal, yet state responsibility for their violations is limited by territoriality as well by citizenship. Each state is responsible for human rights violations occurring in its own territory. In contrast, state responsibilities with regard to citizens of other states are vague and weak. Individuals can claim and enforce rights against their own state (in theory, at least). However, non-resident non-citizens can only claim and enforce rights against other states through their own state.
Territoriality of law conflicts with the postulated universality of human rights because individuals cannot hold a state other than their own responsible for violating their rights; it is their taste that should hold another responsible. This, however, seldom happens. Either the state that intervenes does so because of inequality of power or a legal challenge involves a risk of retaliation that the previously victimized state can ill afford, or in order to promote the purposes and goals of the ruling government in this other country, but not necessarily the interests of the citizens of state.